Does Contract Law Need Morality? by Krawiec, Kimberly D. & Liu, Wenhao
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3069935 
DOES CONTRACT LAW NEED MORALITY? 
KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC* & WENHAO LIU** 
ABSTRACT 
In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an 
ambitious market theory of contract, which he argues is a 
superior normative foundation for contract law than either the 
moralist or economic justifications that currently dominate 
contract theory. In doing so, he sets out a robust defense of 
commerce and the marketplace as contributing to human 
flourishing that is a refreshing and welcome contribution in an 
era of market alarmism. But the market theory ultimately falls 
short as either a normative or prescriptive theory of contract. The 
extent to which law, public policy, and theory should account for 
values other than economic efficiency is a longstanding debate. 
Whatever the merits of that debate, we conclude that contract law 
does not need morality as envisioned by Oman—a fluid, 
subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach to the morality of 
markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In The Dignity of Commerce, Nathan Oman sets out an 
ambitious market theory of contract (hereinafter Market 
Theory), which he argues is a superior normative foundation for 
contract law than either the moralist or economic justifications 
that currently dominate contract theory.1 According to the 
Market Theory, contract law ought to be structured to support 
well-functioning markets because such markets are morally 
desirable.2 The moral virtues of markets thus mark both the 
purpose and limits of contract law.3 If contract law exists to 
support well-functioning markets because such markets are 
morally valuable, then it follows that the law should not support 
immoral or, as termed by Oman, “pernicious” markets.4 
 The significance of this effort should not be understated. 
A clear normative foundation is essential to the understanding 
and application of contract law.5 Only through a theory of why 
the law enforces contracts can one determine, for example, 
which promises should be enforced and which should not, how to 
calculate damages for breach, and the circumstances under 
which performance will be excused.6 The Dignity of Commerce 
thus confronts questions that are both theoretically difficult and 
of practical importance to courts and lawmakers. 
I. THE DIGNITY OF MARKETS (AND CONTRACT) 
  
 One of the book’s most important contributions is its 
emphasis on the positive role played by markets and thus, by 
extension, of contracts.13 In an era rife with warnings about the 
                                            
1 NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE 21 (2016). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 8. 
4 Id. at 160. 
5 See ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 227 (2d ed. 2016). 
6 Id. 
13 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 23. 
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market’s dangers to society,14 Oman’s cogent reminder of the 
market’s benefits is both refreshing and welcome. Oman also 
correctly emphasizes contract law’s important contribution to 
proper market functioning.15 Although this point is recognized in 
economic treatments of contract law,16 Oman argues that it has 
not been accorded sufficient attention, by either economic or 
moralist theories of contract.17 
 Less recognized in the literature is the market’s (and, 
therefore, contract’s) often forgotten role in organizing 
productive social interactions, and it is here that Oman’s 
treatment really shines.18 These social benefits, Oman argues, 
are so important that it is these benefits—rather than a 
commitment to markets in and of themselves—that justify the 
use of state resources to support markets, and thus contracts.19 
 The Dignity of Commerce is descriptive, normative, and 
prescriptive all at once. This is both a strength and weakness of 
the book. Oman’s account is, at least in theory, more 
comprehensive than the competing theories he seeks to replace. 
Both moralist and economic justifications for contract law have, 
for example, been criticized as providing a poor, or at least 
incomplete, descriptive account of contract law.20 Oman’s 
                                            
14 E.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS 
OF MARKETS 11–12 (2012). 
15 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 16. 
16 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 
1115, 1152 (1998) (explaining how third-party enforcement of contracts 
facilitates the emergence of sophisticated capital markets); Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Wenhao Liu, & Marc L. Melcher, Contract Development in a 
Matching Market: The Case of Kidney Exchange, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
11, 20 (2017) (discussing the positive role played by contracts in various 
markets, including matching markets). 
17 OMAN, supra note 7, at 13. 
18 See id. at 11, 15. 
19 Id. at 15. 
20 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the 
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–91 (1989) (arguing that 
moralist theories of contract are irrelevant to wide swaths of contract law, 
including the choice of default rule); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 
830 (arguing that law and economics has failed to provide plausible 
descriptive theories of many important contract law doctrines). 
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descriptive account, by recognizing that conceptions of morality 
and blameworthiness impact contract law, provides a 
descriptively more appealing account than theories that contend 
that contract law is explained solely by economic considerations 
or solely by moral ones.21  
But this insight is not new. Practitioners of law and 
economics have long recognized that judges and lawmakers, 
being largely untrained in economics, are likely to rely on moral 
intuitions when reaching results.22 And Critical Legal Studies 
(CLS) scholars long have insisted on the indeterminacy of 
contract law, arguing that contract law outcomes are best 
explained as a reflection of cultural values, as operationalized by 
powerful decision makers.23 
 The Market Theory is less successful as a normative or 
prescriptive theory, however. As we will show, Oman makes 
moral judgments about the validity of certain markets (and, 
therefore, certain contracts) without providing a theoretical 
framework to replace either the moralist or economic theories he 
rejects.24 As a result, the Market Theory fails to provide 
meaningful guidance to courts, policymakers, or scholars 
confronted with the more difficult questions facing contract 
law.25 
II. THE LIMITS OF MARKETS (AND CONTRACT) 
 Under the Market Theory, contract law exists to 
strengthen and support markets.26 However, markets are not 
ends in themselves.27 Instead the law supports markets only 
because and to the extent that markets provide other moral 
                                            
21 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 11. 
22 POSNER, supra note 11, at 233. 
23 See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies Perspective on 
Contract Law and Practice, ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 257 (“Legal decisions are 
guided by the invisible hand of our complex cultural values, operating 
through their embodiment in our social decision makers.”). 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 63–67. 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 48 Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
26 OMAN, supra note 7, at 16. 
27 See id. at 15. 
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virtues.28 Therefore, unlike the economic analysis of law that it 
seeks to replace, the Market Theory of contract is deeply 
interested in normative questions of morality.29 According to 
Oman: 
 
Markets can be evil. Just as well-functioning markets have 
important moral consequences, pernicious markets can cause 
harm, destroy valuable social and personal goods, and invade 
aspects of life that should be separated from commerce. ... 
[p]ernicious markets mark the limits of contract law. If 
contract law ought to be structured to support well-
functioning markets because such markets are morally 
valuable, it follows that, when markets are pernicious, the 
justification for contract law fails—or at the very least 
weakens dramatically. The market argument thus accounts 
for the universal limitations that we observe in all legal 
systems on the enforcement of contracts. It also focuses our 
attention on the question that we must ask in order to 
understand the limits of contract law: When are markets 
pernicious? (emphasis added).30 
 
 For reasons that we detail below, however, the concept of 
“pernicious markets” has been widely contested.31 Indeed, entire 
books challenge the premise that market trading can introduce 
wrongs into a previously unproblematic activity.32 Some 
activities or actions may be pernicious, of course, particularly 
when they impose harm on third parties.33 The law discourages 
many of these activities by making them illegal. But this is a 
                                            
28 Id. at 16. 
29 See id. at 11, 16. 
30 Id. at 160–61. 
31 See, e.g., JASON BRENNAN & PETER M. JAWORSKI, MARKETS WITHOUT 
LIMITS: MORAL VIRTUES AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 16, 18, 92–93 (2016) 
(arguing that the market does not transform moral acts into immoral ones); 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Foreword: Show Me the Money: Making Markets in 
Forbidden Exchange, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, vi (2009) (demonstrating 
the cultural and historical dependence of views regarding which items 
properly “belong” in the marketplace). 
32 See generally BRENNAN & JAWORSKI, supra note 31. 
33 See infra text accompanying notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–
Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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statement about the evils of the underlying activity, rather than 
a statement about the evils of a particular market.34 
 As we will show in Parts A–B, Oman’s purported 
examples of evil markets are actually examples of evil activities 
(although, as we detail in Parts B–C, Oman provides no criteria 
for determining the evilness of any given activity).35 Accordingly, 
the market argument does not delineate the limits of contract, 
nor can it “account for universal limitations that we observe in 
all legal systems on the enforcement of contracts,” except 
perhaps to say that contract enforcement depends on the 
prevailing norms, prejudices, and culture of the relevant legal 
regime.36 
 
A. Evil Markets Versus Evil Activity: Slavery 
 Oman invokes the example of involuntary servitude and of the 
Atlantic slave trade, in particular, a number of times as an illustration of a 
morally evil market that contract law should not support.37 According to 
Oman: 
The Atlantic slave trade is one of the great moral 
catastrophes of history. Its scale and the brutality of its 
conditions, for example, dwarf other instances of human 
slavery. Unlike tragedies such as the Holocaust or the mass 
murders perpetrated by Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot, the slave 
trade was fundamentally a market atrocity .... It provides the 
best historical example of a pernicious market. Whatever 
benefits the commerce in humans might have conferred on 
merchants or planters, it cannot erase the human misery and 
degradation wrought by the slave trade. Given the evils of 
such a market, the law should not have supported it. 
Accordingly, one should not enforce contracts for the sale of 
slaves.38 (emphasis added) 
 Yet, Oman’s slavery example tells us very little about the 
limits of markets or of contract law, because slavery is an 
                                            
34 See infra Part II.A. 
35 See infra Part II.A–C. 
36 OMAN, supra note 7, at 160–61. 
37 Id. at 163. 
38 Id. 
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example of a pernicious practice, not a pernicious market. 
Forced slavery is almost universally considered wrong, not 
because of market trading, but because to own another human 
being is inconsistent with basic morality and human rights.39 
This conclusion is not dependent on the existence of market 
trading in slaves and would hold even if the law prohibited the 
sale of slaves but permitted their acquisition and ownership 
through other means. If, for example, slaves could be inherited, 
but not sold, or if a society were to permit the gifting of slaves to 
commemorate holidays and birthdays, but banned the 
commercial slave trade, no dominant moral theory would 
suggest that the absence of market trading renders slavery 
moral.40 
 This is because slavery is an immoral practice, without 
regard to the presence or absence of market trading. If it is 
immoral to own slaves, gift slaves, or devise slaves by will, then 
it follows that it is also immoral to trade in slaves and, it 
logically follows, that such contracts should not be enforced. But 
notice that this conclusion has nothing to do with slavery as a 
market. To be sure, there is somewhat more debate surrounding 
the morality of voluntary servitude, such as bonded labor.41 But 
this is not the debate on which Oman relies for insights about 
the limits of markets, invoking instead the example of the 
Atlantic slave trade.42 
 A few examples will highlight the difference between 
forced slavery and transactions that are not considered immoral 
in the absence of commercial trading. There are certain items 
and activities whose exchange is not only permitted, but 
applauded, when motivated by a purpose other than profit-
seeking—love, altruism, kindness, or a sense of duty, for 
                                            
39 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
40 Id. (prohibiting both the slave trade and the holding of another in 
servitude or slavery). 
41 See generally DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR 
SALE, Ch. 8 (2010) (detailing this debate). 
42 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 163–64. 
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example.43 In fact, a failure to provide these goods and services 
in the context of certain relationships may be condemned as 
selfish or self-indulgent.44 A decision to carry and give birth to a 
child for my infertile sister is likely to be lauded as 
compassionate and charitable.45 A failure to donate a life-saving 
kidney to my dying brother will strike some as inexcusably 
selfish. Selling either in a commercial transaction is morally 
contested and often illegal.46 In each case, it is the involvement 
of the market that generates discomfort with the transaction, 
rather than the transaction itself. 
 Oman seems to believe that because the marketplace 
exacerbated slavery’s evils, “the slave trade was fundamentally 
a market atrocity.”47 But the simple exercise of questioning 
whether we would approve of slavery in the absence of market 
trading suggests that this is not the case. And a new and 
elaborate market-based theory of contract is unnecessary to 
reach that result. 
 
B. The Digital Pedophile and the Indebted Gambler 
 Like slavery, the digital pedophile is an example that 
Oman frequently invokes as an example of an evil market that 
contract law should not support.48 Says Oman: 
 
[T]he satisfaction of evil preferences is not morally desirable. 
The world is not better if a twisted sadist can indulge his 
desire to watch violent child pornography, even if no children 
are harmed and the twisted sadist’s actions have no other 
third-party effects.49 
 
                                            
43 Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1740 
(2010). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1741 (discussing the taboo nature of commercial surrogacy). 
46 Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Repugnance Management and 
Transactions in the Body, 107 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 86, 
86–87 (2017). 
47 OMAN, supra note 7, at 163. 
48 Id. at 12. 
49 Id. 
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 As Oman recognizes, traditional economic analysis would 
consider this transaction welfare enhancing, under the 
conditions specified by Oman—the sadist is made better off, and 
no one else is made worse off.50 The digital pedophile’s actions 
are thus Pareto improving. Indeed, Oman specifically invokes 
the digital pedophile example to illustrate what he perceives as 
a central flaw in the economic theory of contract—its lack of 
attention to questions of morality.51 
 But Oman never explains why the world is not better off if 
the twisted sadist can satisfy his preferences with no negative 
third-party effects, simply asserting it as if the answer is 
obvious.52 But the answer is far from obvious. Indeed, even the 
U.S. Supreme Court struggled with this question, before 
declaring a statute prohibiting digital, or virtual, child 
pornography unconstitutional.53 
 For many theorists, of course, efficiency is not the only, or 
even the primary, relevant criterion for judging the value of any 
particular market or transaction.54 But, a rigorous debate about 
whether the world is made better off by the satisfaction of a 
digital pedophile’s preferences needs to be grounded on some 
evaluation criteria. Because the Market Theory provides no 
normative basis for reaching its determination that digital child 
pornography is an evil market not worth supporting, it provides 
                                            
50 Posner, supra note 11, at 230–32 (discussing Pareto efficiency). 
51 OMAN, supra note 7, at 12. 
52 See id. 
53 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255–56 (2002). In reaching 
its decision the Court concluded: 
[T]he CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and 
creates no victims by its production. Virtual child 
pornography is not “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse 
of children .... While the Government asserts that the images 
can lead to actual instances of child abuse ... the causal link is 
contingent and indirect. 
Id. at 250. Six years later, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Congressional response to the Free Speech Coalition ruling, The 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 
(2008). 
54 See, e.g. Satz, supra note at 182- (discussing the limits of efficiency as a 
gauge for determining the desirability of many transactions). 
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no guidance on how courts would, or should, address other 
transactions in which neither third parties nor the participants 
to the contract are harmed. 
 A similar problem arises in Oman’s treatment of 
gambling. According to Oman, Nevada, though famous for 
gambling and casinos, refuses to enforce contracts creating 
gambling debts.55 Oman speaks with seeming approval of 
Nevada’s policy, noting: 
 
Nevada does not take a paternalistic attitude toward 
gambling. If its citizens (or visitors from other states) wish to 
gamble, Nevada does not prohibit them from doing so. It does 
not follow from this, however, that Nevada must enforce their 
contracts .... The litigant calling on the state to enforce a 
contract is not asking to be left free from interference in his or 
her private decisions. Rather, he or she is asking that the 
government act to support the market that will be 
strengthened by the enforcement of the contract.56 
 
 Oman is, of course, correct that the mere fact that Nevada 
permits gambling does not require it to enforce gambling 
contracts. At common law, cash settled forward contracts were 
legal, but unenforceable, precisely on the theory that they were 
speculative contracts, akin to gambling.57 Today a number of 
states permit gestational surrogacy arrangements, but refuse to 
enforce surrogacy contracts.58 
 But Oman provides no justification to support Nevada’s 
policy.59 Thus the Market Theory, rather than providing a 
predictive framework for understanding contract, instead seems 
                                            
55 OMAN, supra note 7, at 164. 
56 Id. at 165. 
57 Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private 
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L. J. 701, 714–15 
(1998). 
58 The Center for American Progress provides a summary of surrogacy 
laws by jurisdiction, showing that some states ban the practice (sometimes 
with criminal penalties and sometimes not) and others simply declare 
surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable as against public policy. Center 
for American Progress, Guide to State Surrogacy Laws (Dec. 17, 2007) 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2007/12/17/3758/guide
-to-state-surrogacy-laws/ [perma.cc/L4HW-5HJ2]. 
59 OMAN, supra note 7, at 165. 
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to suggest that communities will enforce contracts when they 
believe that the underlying behavior is worthy and will fail to do 
so when they disapprove of the underlying behavior. 
 This may indeed be true as a descriptive matter, but is 
not novel—as already noted, adherents of both law and 
economics and CLS have recognized this feature of the law.60 
More importantly, however, the distinction does not appear to be 
about supporting markets. Oman never argues, for example, 
that gambling markets fail to provide the social benefits he 
extols in The Dignity of Commerce or provides any other reason 
for Nevada’s decision that would lend certainty to cases going 
forward.61 
 
C. Taboo Markets 
 So far, we have shown that the Market Theory, by 
claiming to draw the line at immoral markets without providing 
a coherent theory by which to judge that immorality, falls short 
as both a normative and prescriptive theory of contract law.62 In 
an age of increasing market skepticism, this is a 
disappointment. Numerous books, academic articles, and 
popular press pieces have emerged in recent years lamenting a 
perceived expansion of markets and identifying dozens, if not 
hundreds, of potentially pernicious markets.63 The most 
prominent voice is perhaps that of Michael Sandel, whose New 
York Times best seller identifies markets in prison cells, car pool 
lanes, international surrogacy, rights to shoot endangered 
species, concierge medicine, carbon emissions, university legacy 
admissions, military force, line standing, book reading, and 
dozens of other “new” markets as potentially pernicious.64 
                                            
60 POSNER, supra note 11, at 233; Spann, supra note 23, at 257. 
61 OMAN, supra note 7, at 165. 
62 Supra part II.A. B. 
63 See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 14, at 3 5 (2012) (detailing a number of 
potentially pernicious markets). 
64 Id. at 15. We label such markets “new” because, despite Sandel’s claims 
of novelty, at least some of the markets identified by Sandel, such as 
surrogacy, sex work, and mercenaries, are not new at all, while others simply 
take on a new form, as technological or other changes permit forms of 
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 A Market Theory that celebrated the positive attributes of 
markets, as The Dignity of Commerce surely does, while 
providing guidance on the appropriate limits of the marketplace 
would be a welcome contribution to the literature. 
Unfortunately, Oman’s Market Theory tells us very little about 
these and other contested markets, as fully highlighted in the 
book’s final chapter, which addresses pernicious markets.65 
 Given the prior discussion of gambling contracts and digital 
pedophiles in Part II.B, one might expect Oman to view traditional taboo 
markets—such as those for surrogacy services, sex work, and human 
bodily materials—with skepticism.66 After all, these are unquestionably 
controversial exchanges, criticized by observers around the world and 
prohibited in many jurisdictions. But this does not appear to be the case.67 
In discussing surrogacy contracts, for example, Oman notes that “[w]e 
no longer need to speculate about the social effects of surrogacy 
agreements. Such contracts will be honored in at least some 
states, and we now have more than a generation of experience 
with their effects. The dystopian, commodifed future feared by 
Radin has not materialized.”68 
 To be sure, we agree with Oman’s analysis of the evidence 
on surrogacy arrangements and with his conclusions. Our point 
is simply that his analysis is inconsistent with the discussion of 
gambling and digital pedophiles detailed in Part II.B. Recall 
that in the case of digital pedophiles, Oman condemned the 
market as immoral, without respect to the costs and benefits of 
the behavior.69 Yet, in the case of surrogacy contracts, Oman 
urges us to consider evidence of the market’s costs and 
benefits.70 Moreover, Oman seems to overlook what is, to 
surrogacy critics, the most serious objection to commercial 
surrogacy and other taboo trades—the corrupting effect on social 
                                                                                                            
commerce not possible before. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 43, at 1742, 1747, 
1747 n.23 (discussing modern variations on ancient markets). 
65 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 160. 
66 See supra Part II.B. 
67 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 170–71. 
68 Id. at 171. 
69 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 12. 
70 Id. at 171-72. 
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values.71 Such costs are amorphous and not easily identified or 
measured. Surrogacy critics would thus deny that the evidence 
proves such fears unfounded. 
 To reiterate, we agree with Oman’s approach to surrogacy 
contracts and other taboo markets. But then we would also 
enforce contracts for digital pornography, assuming the lack of 
negative externalities posited by Oman. But for opponents of 
taboo markets, such as Margaret Radin, Elizabeth Anderson, 
and Michael Sandel, the objections to surrogacy and other taboo 
markets are similar, if not identical, to the objections to digital 
child pornography—that it corrupts and demeans not only the 
participants to the transaction, but society more generally.72 
Oman’s apparent rejection of these concerns reinforces our sense 
that his metrics for judging the immorality of markets and 
transactions are fluid and, perhaps, idiosyncratic. Society’s 
collective attitude towards any activity, and its collective 
attitude towards markets in any activity, varies across cultures 
and time.73 But our sense is that the Market Theory seeks to do 
more than suggest that contract disputes are often resolved 
against these background cultural norms. If that is correct, then 
the Market Theory must articulate some systematic and 
consistent principles in order to succeed as a prescriptive theory 
of contract. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Dignity of Commerce is an important book on an 
important topic. Indeed, one of us (Krawiec) has adopted the 
                                            
71 Margaret Jane RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 142–43 (1996) (arguing 
that commercial surrogacy is commodifying, reinforces a gender hierarchy 
and corrupts parent-child relationships more generally); ELIZABETH 
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 168 (1993) (“[c]ontract 
pregnancy commodifies both women’s labor and children in ways that 
undermine the autonomy and dignity of women and the love parents owe to 
children.”) 
72 See, e.g., RADIN, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 133; 
ANDERSON, supra note 71, at 148; SANDEL, supra note 14, at 95. 
73  Roth, Alvin E. 2007. Repugnance as a constraint on markets. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 21(3): 37–58 (discussing a variety of “repugnant 
activities” and the impact of people’s repugnance on the underlying markets). 
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book as required reading in an Advanced Contracts course for 
two straight years. Moreover, The Dignity of Commerce is 
particularly timely. We live in a time during which the 
definition of what constitutes a market has become broader than 
ever and the number of goods and services distributed through 
market forces appears to increase almost daily.74 These changes 
are enabled partly by advances in economic theories and partly 
by modern technology.75 But regardless of the underlying 
drivers, markets play an increasingly significant role in our 
social and economic activities, replacing some activities 
traditionally facilitated by idiosyncratic individual efforts, and 
kindness or altruism. 
 These changes are alarming to many observers, who 
believe that they conflict with traditional moral intuitions and 
threaten to displace nonmarket values and ideals.76 Seen in this 
context, Oman’s robust defense of commerce and the 
marketplace as contributing to human flourishing is a 
refreshing and welcome contribution.77 Yet, Oman’s Market 
Theory, which he argues is superior to the moralist and 
economic philosophies that currently dominate contract theory, 
is ultimately unsuccessful on its own terms.78 To be sure, 
devising a new theory of contract law is no easy feat, and we 
applaud the effort. But the Market Theory ultimately falls short 
as either a normative or prescriptive theory of contract. 
 To return to the question with which we began, does 
contract law need morality? This, of course, is an old debate that 
extends well beyond normative theories of contract law. 79 The 
extent to which law, public policy, and theory should account for 
values other than economic efficiency is a longstanding debate, 
                                            
74 ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT—AND WHY: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF 
MATCHMAKING AND MARKET DESIGN 15, 20 22, 225 (2015). 
75 See, e.g., id. at 15, 20 23, 225 (discussing these developments). 
76 E.g., RADIN, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 142–43; 
ANDERSON, supra note 71, at 168. 
77 OMAN, supra note 7, at 125. 
78 See, e.g., id. at 8, 11, 16. 
79 E.g., SATZ, supra note 41, at 182 (rejecting efficiency as the sole measure 
of the assessment of a market); POSNER, supra note 11,12 at 229227–234 
(discussing this debate within contract law). 
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and one we need not resolve here.80 Instead, we merely conclude 
that contract law does not need morality as envisioned by 
Oman—a fluid, subjective, and seemingly instinctual approach 
to the morality of markets. Although the “I know it when I see 
it” approach to morality may accurately describe the way courts 
and lawmakers approach difficult questions of contract law, it 
has little to do with supporting the moral virtues of markets and 
fails to provide a prescriptive theory to guide future cases.81 
 
                                            
80 Id.  
81 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
